

988^a18–23: Introduction

<p>[18] Συντόμως μὲν οὖν καὶ κεφαλαιωδῶς ἐπεληλύθαμεν [19] τίνες τε καὶ πῶς τυγχάνουσιν εἰρηκότες περὶ τε τῶν ἀρχῶν [20] καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας· ὅμως δὲ τοσοῦτόν γ' ἔχομεν ἐξ αὐτῶν, [21] ὅτι τῶν λεγόντων περὶ ἀρχῆς καὶ αἰτίας οὐθεὶς ἔξω τῶν ἐν [22] τοῖς περὶ φύσεως ἡμῖν διωρισμένων εἴρηκεν, ἀλλὰ πάντες [23] ἀμυδρῶς μὲν ἐκείνων δέ πως φαίνονται θιγγάνοντες.</p>	<p>Our account of those who have spoken about first principles and reality and of the way in which they have spoken, has been concise and summary; but yet we have learnt this much from them, that of those who speak about principle and cause no one has mentioned any principle except those which have been distinguished in our work on nature, but all evidently have some inkling of <i>them</i>, though only vaguely</p>
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Reference: *Physics* II 3 (On the four causes)

988^a23–32: Material Cause

<p>οἱ μὲν [24] γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τὴν ἀρχὴν λέγουσιν, ἄν τε μίαν ἄν τε πλείους [25] ὑποθῶσι, καὶ ἑάν τε σῶμα ἑάν τε ἀσωμάτους τιθῶσιν (οἷον [26] Πλάτων μὲν τὸ μέγα καὶ τὸ μικρὸν λέγων, οἱ δ' Ἰταλικοὶ [27] τὸ ἄπειρον, Ἐμπεδοκλῆς δὲ πῦρ καὶ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ [28] ἀέρα, Ἀναξαγόρας δὲ τὴν τῶν ὁμοιομερῶν ἀπειρίαν· οὗτοί [29] τε δὴ πάντες τῆς τοιαύτης αἰτίας ἡμμένοι εἰσὶ, καὶ ἔτι ὅσοι [30] ἀέρα ἢ πῦρ ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ πυρὸς μὲν πυκνότερον ἀέρος δὲ λεπτότερον· [31] καὶ γὰρ τοιοῦτόν τινες εἰρήκασιν εἶναι τὸ πρῶτον [32] στοιχεῖον)·— οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ταύτης τῆς αἰτίας ἤψαντο μόνον,</p>	<p>For some speak of the first principle as matter, whether they suppose one or more first principles, and whether they suppose these to be a body or to be incorporeal; e.g. Plato spoke of the great and the small, the Italians of the infinite, Empedocles of fire, earth, water, and air, Anaxagoras of the infinity of homogeneous things. These, then, have all had a notion of this kind of cause, and so have all who speak of air or fire or water, or something denser than fire and rarer than air; for some have said the prime element is of this kind. These thinkers grasped this cause only;</p>
<p>25 ἀσωμάτους α(E Es C Vd T) ζ(Vk Jc) : ἀσώματον τοῦτο β(Ab M) : ἀσώματον Al.^p 61,11 34 καὶ α(E Es T) : ἢ β(Ab M Vk Jc) : ἢ ex καὶ Vd</p>	

References: A 3–6

988^a33–^b6: Efficient Cause and Formal Cause

<p>[33] ἕτεροι δὲ τινες ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως (οἷον ὅσοι φιλίαν [34] καὶ νεῖκος ἢ νοῦν ἢ ἔρωτα ποιοῦσιν ἀρχήν)</p>	<p>But certain others have mentioned the source of movement, e.g. those who make friendship and strife, or reason, or love, a principle.</p>
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<p>τὸ δὲ τί ἦν εἶναι [35] καὶ τὴν οὐσίαν σαφῶς μὲν οὐθεὶς ἀποδέδωκε, μάλιστα δ' οἱ τὰ [988b 1] εἶδη τιθέντες λέγουσιν</p> <p>(οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ὕλην τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς τὰ [2] εἶδη</p> <p>καὶ τὸ ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσιν οὔθ' ὡς ἐντεῦθεν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς [3] κινήσεως γιγνομένην ὑπολαμβάνουσιν – ἀκινήσιας γὰρ αἷτια [4] μᾶλλον καὶ τοῦ ἐν ἡρεμίᾳ εἶναι φασιν –</p> <p>ἀλλὰ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι [5] ἐκάστω τῶν ἄλλων τὰ εἶδη παρέχονται, τοῖς δ' εἶδεσι τὸ [6] ἔν)</p>	<p>The essence, i.e. the substance of things, no one has expressed distinctly.</p> <p>It is mentioned chiefly by those who believe in the Forms;</p> <p>for they do not suppose either that the Forms are the matter of sensible things, and the One the matter of the Forms, or that they are the source of movement</p> <p>(for they say these are causes rather of immobility and of being at rest), but they furnish the Forms as the essence of every other thing, and the One as the essence of the Forms.</p>
<p>1 τὰ εἶδη τιθέντες α(E T Es1) : εἶδη τιθέντες Vd1 : τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ ἐν τοῖς εἶδεσι τιθέντες β(Ab M Vk C Jc) Vd2 Es2; cf. ^b1–2 ὕλην α(E Es Vd T) : ὕλη β(Ab M Vk Jc) 2 τὸ ἐν Bonitz : τὰ ἐν codd. Al.^c 62,12 3 αἷτια μᾶλλον α(E Es Vd) ζ(Vk C Jc) : μᾶλλον αἷτια T : αἷτιαν μᾶλλον β(Ab M) <Vd></p>	

References: A 3–4, A 6

988^b6–16: Final Cause

<p>τὸ δ' οὐ ἔνεκα αἱ πράξεις καὶ αἱ μεταβολαὶ καὶ αἱ [7] κινήσεις</p> <p>τρόπον μὲν τινα λέγουσιν αἷτιον, οὕτω δὲ οὐ λέγου- [8]σιν</p> <p>οὐδ' ὥνπερ πέφυκεν.</p> <p>οἱ μὲν γὰρ νοῦν λέγοντες ἢ φιλίαν [9] ὡς ἀγαθὸν μὲν τι ταύτας τὰς αἰτίας τιθέασιν, οὐ μὴν ὡς [10] ἔνεκά γε</p> <p>τούτων ἢ ὧν ἢ γιγνόμενόν τι τῶν ὄντων</p> <p>ἀλλ' ὡς [11] ἀπὸ τούτων τὰς κινήσεις οὔσας λέγουσιν·</p> <p>ὡς δ' αὐτως καὶ [12] οἱ τὸ ἐν ἢ τὸ ὄν φάσκοντες εἶναι τὴν τοιαύτην φύσιν</p> <p>τῆς [13] οὐσίας μὲν αἷτιόν φασιν εἶναι, οὐ μὴν τούτου γε ἔνεκα ἢ εἶναι ἢ [14] γίγνεσθαι,</p> <p>ὥστε λέγειν τε καὶ μὴ λέγειν πως συμβαίνει αὐ- [15]τοῖς τὰγαθὸν αἷτιον·</p> <p>οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς [16] λέγουσιν.</p>	<p>That for the sake of which actions and changes and movements take place, they assert to be a cause in a way, but not in this way, i.e. not in the way in which it is its <i>nature</i> to be a cause.</p> <p>For those who speak of reason or friendship class these causes as goods; they do not speak, however, as if anything that exists either existed or came into being for the sake of these, but as if movements started from these.</p> <p>In the same way those who say the One or the existent is the good, say that it is the cause of substance, but not that substance either is or comes to be for the sake of this.</p> <p>Therefore it turns out that in a sense they both say and do not say the good is a cause; for they do not call it a cause <i>qua</i> good but only incidentally.</p>
<p>8 ἢ α(E Es Vd T) ζ(Vk C Jc) : καὶ β(Ab M) 9 μὲν τι α(E Es T) ζ(Vk C Jc) : μὲν β(Ab M) <Vd> : μέντοι Vd 12 ἐν ἢ τὸ ὄν α(E Es Vd T) : ὄν ἢ τὸ ἐν β(Ab M Vk C Jc) 13 οὐσίας μὲν α(E Es T) : μὲν οὐσίας β(Ab M) : οὐσίας Vd ζ(Vk C Jc) : <μὲν> οὐσίας <Vd> ἢ α(E Es Vd T) : om. β(Ab M Vk C Jc) 15 οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς λέγουσιν α(E Es Vd T) ζ(Vk C Jc) Al. 63,18, qui verba κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς citat : om. β(Ab M) συμβεβηκὸς α(E Vd T) : συμβεβηκὸς εἶναι Es ζ(Vk C Jc)</p>	

References: A 3–4

988^b16–21: Result and Transition

<p>—ὅτι μὲν οὖν ὀρθῶς διώρισται περὶ τῶν αἰτίων καὶ [17] πόσα καὶ ποῖα, μαρτυρεῖν ἐοίκασιν ἡμῖν καὶ οὗτοι πάντες, [18] οὐ δυνάμενοι θιγεῖν ἄλλης αἰτίας, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὅτι ζητη-[19]τέαι αἱ ἀρχαὶ ἢ οὕτως ἅπασαι ἢ τινὰ τρόπον τοιοῦτον, δηλον· [20] πῶς δὲ τούτων ἕκαστος εἴρηκε καὶ πῶς ἔχει περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν, [21] τὰς ἐνδεχομένας ἀπορίας μετὰ τοῦτο διέλθωμεν περὶ αὐτῶν.</p>	<p>All these thinkers then, as they cannot pitch on another cause, seem to testify that we have determined rightly both how many and of what sort the causes are.</p> <p>Besides this it is plain that when the causes are being looked for, either all four must be sought thus or they must be sought in one of these four ways. Let us next discuss the possible difficulties with regard to the way in which each of these thinkers has spoken, and with regard to his views about the first principles.</p>
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19 τοιοῦτον Bywater : τούτων codd.

References: A as a whole